Global Critical Race Feminism

An International Reader

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Foreword by
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Introduction

Global Critical Race Feminism for the Twenty-First Century

Adrien Katherine Wing

In this introduction I hope to identify the intellectual threads that have contributed to this loosely woven tapestry I am labeling Global Critical Race Feminism (GCRLF). The volume expands upon the issues addressed in my well-received first anthology, Critical Race Feminism: A Reader (New York University Press, 1997). That original book was the first collection predominantly focusing on the legal status of women of color living in the United States, that is, African Americans, Latinas, Asians, and Native Americans. In the words of CRF foremother Professor Mari Matsuda, these women can experience “multiple consciousness,” an awareness of oppression they face based simultaneously on their race/ethnicity and gender. The volume emphasized not only the experience of discrimination, but also resilience, resistance, and the formation of solutions. It covered such diverse areas as anti-essentialism, education, mothering, employment, welfare reform, criminality, domestic violence, and sexual harassment. The final part of the volume introduced global themes.

In my travels I am frequently asked the meaning of this odd term “Critical Race Feminism.” Some people have wondered whether CRF adherents are “male-hating, bra-burning feminazis in blackface.” Some men of color have asked whether we are race traitors who give greater priority to gender than to racial solidarity. Professor Richard Delgado of the University of Colorado Law School coined the term CRF in the first edition of his anthology Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge (Temple University Press, 1995). The beauty of the strange expression is that each word represents one of the primary legal traditions from which it derives—Critical Legal Studies (CLS), Critical Race Theory (CRT), and feminist jurisprudence. The word “global” added to the title of this collection implies the embrace of strands from international and comparative law, global feminism, and post-colonial theory as well.
When I explain the derivation of CRF in some circles, I am sometimes met by a stony silence or a condescendingly polite response, “Oh, that’s very nice,” as the conversation returns to “real law.” Implicit in the exchange or lack of exchange may be skepticism on several levels. Isn’t the concept of “women of color” non-visible as an organizing principle for scholarly work or activism, whether U.S. or internationally focused? Isn’t the situation of minority group women in the United States categorically different from the status of “Third World” women in the countries of origin of their families or ancestors? Aren’t the concerns of this subcategory of people covered adequately by “real law,” that is, race- and gender-neutral law? If not, doesn’t the U.S. race and gender discrimination law that has evolved primarily from the 1960s civil rights movements adequately protect women of color? Doesn’t the post–World War II international legal regime that has developed principally since “First World” decolonization of most of the “Third World” encompass the legal problems of “Third World” women?

Critical Race Feminism is evolving as a richly textured genre interwoven with many areas of jurisprudence because the answer to all the above questions is a resounding “No!” As the articles in both my anthologies illustrate, existing legal paradigms under U.S., foreign, and international law have permitted women of color to fall through the cracks—becoming literally and figuratively voiceless and invisible. This volume attempts to not only identify and theorize about those cracks in the legal regime, but to formulate relevant solutions as well. Sometimes a little mortar will suffice, while in other instances an entire wall of a legal edifice must come down.

First, what about the validity of the term “women of color” as an organizing principle? Chandra Mohanty describes it as a sociopolitical designation for women of African, Caribbean, Asian, Latin American, and indigenous descent. Despite constituting a plurality of the world’s people, women of color are usually situated on the bottom rung of each society, whether they live in developed or developing countries. The concept goes beyond mere color or racial identification. What all these women may have in common is their potential political relationship—likely an oppositional one—to sexist, racist, and imperialist structures.²

The authors in this collection are consciously engaged in revealing and challenging such discriminatory structures. As editor, I have deliberately chosen to feature predominantly the words of women of color themselves in an effort to break the silence and invisibility of such women in legal discourse. By foregrounding women of color, I am not saying that others can not write about the plight of these women. Men and Anglo women can certainly do so, and in this collection several of the contributors fall into one of these categories, most notably Professors Devon W. Carbado, J. Clay Smith, Jn., Taimie L. Bryant, Brenda J. Cossman, Mary L. Dudziak, Martha I. Morgan, and Zorica Mrsevic.

I do endorse, however, Mari Matsuda’s notion of a “distinctive voice” that some (but certainly not all) people of color may possess in discussing the terms of their own oppression.³ For example, in this volume Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, a Japanese scholar who came to the United States to earn her law degree, reveals a perspective in her essay as a Japanese woman in these parts. T. Knapp’s, T. that Bryant A more r are both on the legal b et that of a Sc All the a well. Thus women of been attack Richard Pt Richard Di color. I ag color from color from the most of King was t whether he color does color, most the revolution, t made the r trist Frantz handas K. African Xh relative cor these comp served as “and the pov ety. The we olent prote
in her essay on Japanese women that is informed to a large degree by her own status as a Japanese female. The distinguished UCLA professor Taimie Bryant also writes in these pages on Japanese women, but it cannot be from the same perspective as Knapp’s. This is not to say that there is one essential Japanese view on an issue or that Bryant’s views are wrong. They may even be similar to those of Ms. Knapp.

A more nuanced example of “distinctive voice” presents itself when two authors are both women of color, but from different ethnicities. For instance, I have written on the legal rights of both Black South African and Palestinian women, even though I belong to neither group. As an African American whose people have suffered discrimination for nearly four hundred years in the United States, I can empathize with the struggles of these women to confront various forms of oppression. I do not delude myself, however, that my perspective would be identical, much less superior, to that of a South African or a Palestinian woman.

All the authors in this collection are lawyers, and most are legal academics as well. Thus this book does not purport to directly represent the voices of the poorest women of color. The very notion of a “distinctive voice” for people of color has been attacked on class grounds by such conservative scholars as U.S. federal judge Richard Posner. He has challenged the validity of “elite” law professors like Richard Delgado who “claim” to speak on behalf of disenfranchised people of color. I agree with Posner that we law professors of color are an elite, a tiny portion of groups disproportionately impoverished. I disagree wholeheartedly, however, with Judge Posner’s inference that we therefore have no commonalities with the most oppressed people from our groups. I am quite certain that when Rodney King was beaten up by the Los Angeles police force, the officers did not ask him whether he was a lawyer. He was Black and animal-like, which justified their behavior in their own eyes. Elite class status as intellectuals does not shield people of color from racial attacks. Similarly, with respect to my gender, my job as a law professor does not shield me from the threat of rape.

As individuals writing about the concerns of disproportionately poor people of color, most authors in this collection have chosen to “look to the bottom” and identify with the oppressed, in the words of Mari Matsuda. The assassinated African revolutionary leader Amilcar Cabral went even further and called for “class suicide” by intellectuals of color. These concepts may characterize an aspect of what made the middle-class Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King sacrifice himself for the rights of the many poor Blacks. They may have influenced the Caribbean psychiatrist Frantz Fanon to write about the “wretched of the earth,” and the lawyer Mohandas K. Gandhi to identify with the most despised class of Indians. The South African Xhosa tribal royal member/lawyer Nelson Mandela gave up the potential relative comfort of his privileged positions and said, “the struggle is my life.” All these comparatively privileged individuals felt a tremendous sense of obligation and served as “translators” between the invisible, voiceless oppressed of their people and the power elite—the men who were the captains of industry, politics, and society. The weapons of communication varied from the pen to the sword, from nonviolent protest to armed struggle.
In this volume we are consciously attempting to translate between cultures—the cultures of privilege of those who have the luxury of time and capacity to read a book like this and the cultures of those who will never have the opportunity to enjoy such intellectual largesse. As translators, we therefore are assisting in demarginalizing the lives and legal concerns of women of color.7

GENESIS

GCRF originates from a collection of interrelated intellectual trends that emerged at the end of the twentieth century. It is my fervent hope that these colorful threads will continue to evolve into an increasingly interwoven tapestry that will have a place in global academic discourse in the twenty-first century. It is not that GCRF is a simple hybrid, but that the trends are “elements in the conditions of its possibility.”8 The three strands I will now briefly discuss are CLS, CRT, and feminism.9

The Conference on Critical Legal Studies was organized in the late 1970s by a “collection of neo-Marxist intellectuals, former New Left activists, ex-counter-culturalists, and other varieties of oppositionists in law schools.”10 Like these men, Critical Race feminists endorse a progressive perspective on the role of law in American society. We critique both conservative orthodoxies and legal liberalism. We challenge the notion of law as neutral, objective, and determinate. We may also use the deconstruction methodology of European postmodernists like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault to expose how law has served to perpetuate unjust class, race, and gender hierarchies.

As part of CRT, CRF extends beyond the intellectual borders of CLS. According to Harvard professor Cornel West, “CRT is a gasp of emancipatory hope that law can serve liberation rather than domination.”11 CRT constitutes a race intervention in leftist discourse and a leftist intervention in race discourse.12 In illuminating the racist nature of the American legal system, CRT adherents are particularly interested in legal manifestations of white supremacy and the perpetuation of the subordination of people of color. While we are concerned with class issues since the majority of people of color are impoverished, we realize that poor communities of color have never been treated the same as the white underclass. Although CRT endorses the CLS notion that legal rights are indeterminate, we vehemently disagree that rights are therefore not important.13 Indeed, the struggle to attain human rights remains critical for American minorities who have never had the luxury of taking such rights for granted.

In addition to challenging leftist discourse, CRT proponents also simultaneously engage in a leftist critique of liberal civil rights paradigms. We believe that racism has been an integral part of the American legal system since its founding, rather than an aberrational spot on the pristine white body politic. Racial progress is not necessarily inevitable, but may be cyclical. Gains often occur only if they are compatible with the self-interest of the white power elite.14 We thus reject the notion that the legal system has ever been color-blind, and specifically embrace color con-
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If racism was merely a spot, it could be cured with band-aid approaches like affirmative action, whose real purpose in the United States “is to create enough exceptions to white privilege to make the mythology of equal opportunity seem at least plausible.” Instead racism is like a cancer that permeates the body. It must be tackled with comprehensive approaches like the surgical, chemical, and/or radiation therapy of fundamental socioeconomic change. Despite the massive blitzkrieg, racism may persevere, spread, appear to be in remission for a while, only to reappear in a more virulent form. Some of the CRT adherents may even agree with a CRT founder, Professor Derrick Bell of New York University Law School, that racism is a permanent condition that can never be truly eradicated.17 Cornel West has carefully articulated some of the existential questions engaging CRT.

How do we candidly incorporate experiences of intense alienation and subordination into the subtle way of “doing” theory in American academy? What are the new constructive frameworks that result from the radical critiques of the prevailing paradigms in United States legal education? What is our vocation as oppositional intellectuals who choose to stay in a legal academy of which we do not feel fully a part? How can liberation-minded scholars of color engage with white radical intellectuals without falling into the pitfalls of coalitions between such groups in the sixties?18

CRT also has begun to make contributions to international and comparative law discourse. For example, UCLA law professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has addressed the timely topic of globalization, which constitutes a racialized massive redistribution of wealth, power, and resources from the developing world to the developed—a form of economic apartheid. Richard Delgado has compared the treatment of hate speech in the United States with other constitutional systems where such speech is legally limited. Temple law professor Henry Richardson used a comparative analysis of international responses to the 1992 Los Angeles riots to show the poverty of American racial discourse. He and Villanova law professor Ruth Gordon have tackled the notion of “failed states,” and shown how the espousal of a doctrine that would permit recolonization of failed states would be destructive to peoples of color internationally.19

As Critical Race theorists, CRF adherents sometimes use the controversial narrative or storytelling technique as methodology. Opponents have attacked this approach as nonlegal, lacking intellectual rigor, overly emotional, and subjective.20 This methodology, however, has significant value. Many of us prize our heritages in which the oral tradition has had historical importance—where vital notions of justice and the law are communicated generation to generation through the telling of stories. Also, using stories enables us to connect to those who do not understand hypertechnical legal language, but may nonetheless seek understanding of our distinctive voices.21 In this volume several authors use narrative techniques. For example, the Chinese lawyer Mai Chen details the multiple forms of discrimination she confronted growing up as a minority female in New Zealand. The Serbian feminist
law professor Zorica Mrsevic uses the voices of Gypsy women in Serbia to illustrate the nature of their multilayered oppression.

We also believe in using critical historical methodology to demarginalize the roles people of color have played, usually outside the scope of the traditional historian’s interests. In this volume, for example, the USC law professor Mary Dudziak explores the transnational fight waged by the entertainer Josephine Baker against U.S. racial injustice prior to the 1960s civil rights movement. Howard law professor J. Clay Smith, Jr., presents the global public service of the late Goler Butcher, an early Black female law professor.

Additionally, we endorse a multidisciplinary approach to scholarship in which the law may be a necessary, but not sufficient basis to formulate solutions to racial dilemmas. This book features significant citation to disciplines such as history, sociology, political science, economics, and anthropology, as well as African American studies and women’s studies.

Although CRF proponents endorse Critical Race Theory, we wholeheartedly embrace critical race praxis as well.22 Since many of us come from disenfranchised communities of color, we feel compelled to “look to the bottom,” to involve ourselves in the development of solutions to our people’s problems. We cannot afford to adopt the classic, detached, ivory tower model of scholarship when so many are suffering, sometimes in our own extended families. We do not believe in praxis instead of theory, but believe that both are essential to our peoples’ literal and figurative future. For example, in this collection, the attorney Laura Ho combines her voice with those of law professors Catherine Powell and Leti Volpp to focus on the role of grassroots organizations as well as lawyers in assisting garment workers globally.

There are many forms that praxis can take. In addition to working with various public interest and nongovernmental organizations, Critical Race feminists have engaged in law reform in the United States and internationally. Coalition building, political activism, board memberships, speeches, and even writing can all be forms of praxis. My own attempts at praxis have included working with the actor and former star athlete Jim Brown’s Amer-I-Can Program, a rehabilitative and preventive self-esteem curriculum ideally suited for youth at risk, ex-offenders, gang members, and others. This praxis enabled me to enrich my own efforts at theorizing about gang life. Internationally, I have advised the African National Congress Constitutional Committee on options for the democratic South Africa, as well as the Palestinian Legislative Council as it drafted the first constitution. Once again, these efforts enriched my subsequent scholarship and teaching on these topics.

Another jurisprudential tradition that CRF draws from is feminism. CRF constitutes a race intervention in feminist discourse, in that it necessarily embraces feminism’s emphasis on gender oppression within a system of patriarchy. But most CRF proponents have not joined the mainstream feminist movement. While reasons vary, in some cases the refusal to become associated is due to that movement’s essentialization of all women, which subsumes the variable experiences of women of color within the experience of white middle-class women.23 Mainstream feminism has paid in
Serbia to illustrate arginalize the roles ditional historian’s Mary Dudziak ex- Baker against U.S. rd law professor J. er Butcher, an early holarship in which solutions to racial such as history, soci- s African American wholeheartedly em- om disenfranchised m, " to involve our- s. We cannot afford p when so many are believe in praxis in- s’ literal and figura- a Ho combines her Olpp to focus on the g garment workers orking with various ze feminists have en- alition building, po- s can all be forms of h the actor and for- ative and preventive ders, gang members, at theorizing about Congress Constitu- as well as the Pales- Once again, these ef- topics. minism. CRF consti- arly embraces fem- archy. But most CRF nent. While reasons that movement’s ex- iences of women of mainstream feminism has paid insufficient attention to the central role of white supremacy’s subordina- tion of women of color, effectuated by both white men and women. Nevertheless, some of the authors featured herein, such as St. Johns law professor Berta Esper- anza Hernández-Truyol, pull from various prominent threads in feminism that may have relevance for their analysis, such as notions of formal equality, dominance/in- equality, socialism, hedonic feminism, pragmatic feminism, radical feminism, and liberal feminism.

In developing our critiques of feminist jurisprudence, we have been influenced by feminists of color outside the legal academy. For example, scholars such as Patricia Hill Collins, Angela Davis, bell hooks, the late Audre Lorde, and Alice Walker have developed Black feminist or “womanist” notions that we have attempted to apply in legal contexts.

In addition to rejecting essentialism in feminism, Critical Race feminists reject CRT’s essentialization of all minorities. As the experiences of males may differ significantly from those of females, we are thus a feminist intervention within CRT. Our anti-essentialist premise is that identity is not additive. In other words, Black women are not white women plus color, or Black men plus gender.

Through this volume, CRF goes beyond the domestic focus on the United States that is typical of most scholarship on CLS, CRT, and feminism, and embraces global or transnational perspectives. We are extending the narrow U.S. notion of race to examine the legal treatment of women of color, whether they are living in developing or industrialized societies. I hope that the works in this collection will inspire scholars to engage in looking at multiple levels of discrimination and privileging that women may simultaneously face globally, not only on the basis of their race and gender, but also due to their nationality, ethnicity, color, class, sexual ori- entation, age, disability, religion, primary language, minority status, pregnancy status, and marital status.

GLOBAL MULTIPLICATIVE IDENTITIES

As previously stated, Mari Matsuda coined the term “multiple consciousness” to describe the intersectional identities of women of color. In earlier scholarship, I have chosen to use the word “multiplicative” to configure identity. As a simplistic example, I am Black X female. If you multiply my identities, you have one indivisible being. You cannot subtract out any part of my identity, and ask me to pretend I am only a woman today or only a Black. Currently, I am in the beginning stages of developing a global perspective on identity that I would like to share here. My initial premise is that everyone has multiple identities, not just women of color in the United States. Anglo-Saxon American males have multiple identities, and in a global context, most of their identities may privilege them. Women of color, on the other hand, may primarily possess a cluster of identities that lead them to face multiple forms of discrimination. But the analysis must become more complex. Even women of color, who are disproportionately impoverished, may have some identities
that relatively privilege them. To assist women of color, we need to delineate their multiple identities, examine how those identities intersect to privilege or lead them to face discrimination, and then design multidimensional programs that would enhance their life situations.

I will now detail a number of identities that everyone has and, for simplicity’s sake, discuss them separately. In reality, the impact of the intersection of the identities should be elaborated simultaneously.

For instance, one of the major identities we have is our nationality. While we are in our home country, that status might not be central to us on a daily basis. On the other hand, when I am traveling abroad, my American identity may privilege me or lead me to face discrimination. For example, every summer I teach in South Africa. When I go shopping in the stores, the white shopkeepers often frown at my brown face. As soon as I speak in my American accent, their faces beam and they are most helpful. I represent the almighty dollar. That same status has caused me to fear being robbed or ripped off, since I might be regarded as a “rich American.” It took me a number of trips before I realized that indeed I am a rich American, at least as juxtaposed to the majority of Africans.

Even in the United States, my U.S. nationality may matter in many situations. I know that I can theoretically receive many benefits not open to “illegal aliens,” legal tourists, foreign students, or even permanent residents.

Another central identity is race, which CRT and CRF naturally highlight. One tenet of CRT is that race is socially constructed, rather than biologically determined. As a matter of fact, scientists have shown that there are often more genetic similarities across different so-called racial groups than within them. To illustrate how race is socially constructed globally, in the United States I am considered a member of the Black race. Both my parents and both sets of grandparents are African Americans. In South Africa, because of my light skin tone, shape of nose, and wavy hair texture, I am regarded as a Colored or mixed-race person. I am far too light to be considered Black. When I walk down the street there with my partner, who is a dark-skinned Black American, we are considered an interracial couple. In Brazil I discovered I am considered white! Only the darkest people of relatively unmixed African descent are considered Black in that country.

This example also illustrates the importance of an identity based on skin color. My skin tone has caused me to be called Latina, Indian, Arab, mulatto, biracial, and so forth. Within the Black American group, my coloring has historically led to a privileged position, because I am something known as “high yellow.” The lighter-skinned Blacks have received benefits dating back to slavery, often because they were the master’s illegitimate progeny. They may have become “house niggers” instead of field hands. Apparently the only slaves Thomas Jefferson freed upon his death were the children of his longtime slave mistress Sally Hemings. Several of these children immediately passed over into the white world, and the whereabouts of many of their descendants are unknown.

Today, lighter-skinned African Americans remain overrepresented in the numbers of Blacks who have attended college and attained professional status. In my own maternal far the actions Pierre Guste Susan on the are white in State Univer phy, Life on Was Black. cption in luten often told.

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maternal family's case, I am a third-generation college graduate in part because of the actions taken by my maternal great-great-grandfather, Confederate General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, who apparently set his quadroon daughter Susan on the path of higher education. Paradoxically, we even have Blacks who are white in color, such as my former colleague, Dean Gregory Williams of Ohio State University Law School, who has written about his identity in his autobiography, Life on the Color Line: The True Story of a White Boy Who Discovered He Was Black. Internationally, I believe my skin tone has contributed to my warm acceptance in many countries. “You look just like my sister, mother, or aunt,” I am often told.

Ethnicity is an interesting aspect of identity, but one that may be too often conflated with race, even in CRT-oriented scholarship. Although my skin color indicates many possible ethnicities, I am Black American or African American. Blacks who are from the Caribbean or Africa living in the United States may not consider themselves part of the same group to which I belong. At one law school in Florida there is a Black Law Students Association and a Caribbean student group as well. Imagine a white South African who moves to the United States and becomes a citizen. Isn’t she an African American? I have cousins who are Jamaican Americans and Liberian Americans. Some consider themselves Black Americans and some do not.

Another identity can be one's status as a member of a minority group. While a Nigerian American is a minority in the United States and may be subjected to some discrimination or relative privileging, in Nigeria this person is obviously not a minority. Instead it may be their ethnic status as Yoruba or Hausa that helps or hinders them.

Religious affiliation is an important aspect of identity for many people. In the U.S. context, I am a secular mainstream denominational Protestant, and I do not often think about this status. When I travel to the Middle East, my identity as a Muslim. During the Palestinian uprising from 1987 to 1993, I visited the Gaza Strip several times. At one point, Islamic fundamentalists were stoning or throwing things at women who were not wearing a hijab, or head scarf. Even though I was a Christian and thus technically not subject to the admonition against bare heads, I put on the hijab. Since my coloring and facial features indicate that I could be mistaken for a Palestinian, I was not willing to take a chance of trying to reason with a stone thrower.

With respect to gender, I will not belabor the point here since this identity is a central focus of this book. On a personal note, I recall amusedly the numerous incidents where people have visited my office, looked at me behind my desk, and asked, "Where is Professor Wing, where is he?” The assumption of many men and women are that only men can be professors.

Interestingly, when traveling globally I am usually considered an “honorary male” and invited to dinners where no other women may be present. I have been served meals by women, who then retreat to a back room to eat with other women
and children, as their men and I discuss politics, business, or international relations. My efforts to bridge the chasms of class, ethnicity, and culture that divide us are often defeated by our inability to speak the same language. Many wives have not had the same educational opportunities as their husbands to learn an international language like English. When I can communicate directly or through translation, I find that my identity as a mother is very valuable. As a mother of many sons, I am often considered multiply blessed and conversation may focus on the accomplishments of my fine young men.

My monolingual identity is a major inhibitor to my communication internationally, and that of most Americans. The hodgepodge of French, Portuguese, Swahili, Spanish, and Arabic that I can utter does not substitute for the multilingual fluency needed for nuanced discourse. For example, if I must use male translators to ask uneducated Palestinian women how they feel about their lives, how am I to judge the filtered responses? What editing has occurred? What facial and tonal nuances have I missed because of my primary English-speaking identity? What fears do they have that I will get them in trouble with their menfolk as I satisfy my outsider curiosity?

Sexual orientation is an identity that heterosexuals rarely think about, since they are privileged on this basis. I did not realize how much my heterosexuality was part of my identity until lesbian friends pointed out the privileges I enjoyed every day: feeling free to talk about my partner, hold hands in public, place his picture in my office, slow dance at a club, and so forth. Thus even though I have felt discrimination as a Black woman, my situation is not the same as that of a Black lesbian. It is the work of such lesbians, like the late Audre Lorde, that helped me understand the holistic nature of identity:

As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different ingredients of my identity, and a woman committed to racial and sexual freedom from oppression, I find I am constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of myself. But this is a destructive and fragmenting way to live. My fullest concentration of energy is available to me only when I integrate all the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular sources of my living to flow back and forth freely through all my different selves, without the restrictions of externally imposed definition. Only then can I bring myself and my energies as a whole to the service of those struggles which I embrace as part of my living.29

Marx, Engels, Lenin, and their followers developed socialist theory and left the world the legacy of class analysis. In the legal academy, CLS has developed a literature that addresses this aspect. Much of CRT focuses implicitly or explicitly on class, but sometimes conflates lower or working class with minority racial/ethnic status. As previously noted, some of the attacks on CRT criticize it for essentializing minorities, and have pondered how upper-class law professors of color dare speak for poor, oppressed masses.

Age is another aspect of identity, one that obviously changes over time. In some careers such as athletics, modeling, or acting for women, youth is a privileging iden-
In other fields such as law, senior scholars may be accorded a respect and stature that eludes the young. My senior female colleagues assure me that this is definitely not the case for them as women. I also suspect that relatively youthful appearance has exacerbated the voluminous amount of what is now termed "sexism," but this is a matter for debate. The case for women as a class is more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in promiscuous sexual activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class. Women are more likely to engage in premarital sex activity than can be the case for men as a class.

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American and European white male scholars. Men of color from the developing world did not become involved until their respective nations gained independence or sufficient clout in entities like the United Nations. Their voices are still muted, but often rise in discussions of cultural relativism and human rights. Western women have only recently become involved in attempting to reconceptualize international law from feminist perspectives. Global feminists have noted that international law has failed to address what takes place in the private sphere of the family, where most women spend a significant part of their time.

One final thread contributing to the GCRF tapestry is postcolonial theory, which "is marked by a dialectic between Marxism, on the one hand, and poststructuralism/postmodernism, on the other . . . manifesting itself in an ongoing debate between the competing claims of nationalism and internationalism, strategic essentialism and hybridity, solidarity and dispersal, the politics of structure/totality and the politics of the fragment." According to Leela Gandhi, postcolonialism's constituency is the "western academy and it enables nonwestern critics located in the west to present their cultural inheritance as knowledge." Several authors featured in this volume fit into this latter category, including the Nigerian Lesyle Amede Obiora, the South African Penelope E. Andrews, Ghanaian Rosemary Ofiebea Ofei-Aboaegye King, and the Japanese Kiyoko Knapp.

GCRF contributes to the development of international law, global feminism, and postcolonial theory by demarginalizing women of color in a theoretical and practical sense. Women of color may be simultaneously dominated in the context of imperialism, neocolonialism, or occupation as well as local patriarchy, culture, and customs. They have often had to choose between the nationalist struggle for independence or self-determination and the women's struggle against patriarchy. The nationalist struggle usually has prevailed, and the women who have just helped throw off the yoke of outsider oppression have then been forced back into the "women's work" of taking care of the house and children. Open acceptance of feminism can be seen as an unpatriotic embrace of Western values that may be regarded as inimical to local culture. One of the dilemmas for those who do choose to be known as feminists is how to embrace the universality of women's international human rights in their own cultural context. Despite the various difficulties, these women continue to insist on the complex interrelationships between feminist, antiracist, and nationalist struggles.

The Anthology

Now that I have identified the intellectual threads that have contributed to the development of Global Critical Race Feminism, I will briefly introduce each part of the anthology and make a few comments about each contribution. When originally undertaking this project, I thought there would barely be enough material for one volume. I was pleasantly surprised to learn that I had enough material for several volumes. Unfortunately, space limitations do not permit such treatment at this time.
Thus I have carefully selected the pieces featured here as representative of some of the themes that GCRF is addressing.

Part 1 focuses on encounters with the “F” word: responses to feminism. The authors explore such questions as how to make the feminist theories developed primarily by white North American academics have relevance for women of color. What kinds of methodologies will enhance our understanding of their lives? Can liberation have different meanings in different cultural contexts? Can First World and Third World women collaborate effectively on feminist projects?

The Canadian Brenda Cossman situates her feminist analysis within the new approaches to comparative law movement and postcolonial theory. She explores “the possibilities of renegotiating the Anglo-American moorings of feminist legal studies, by displacing the unstated [Western] norms and center in favor of multiple norms and frames of reference.” Her perspective has been influenced by her frequent collaboration with the Indian feminist lawyer Ratna Kapur.

New Mexico law professor Antoinette Sedillo Lopez is also a comparativist, and she calls for a clearly articulated methodology of feminist analysis in her contribution. Using her own research on abortion laws in Mexico and the United States, she develops a multipronged Critical Race feminism approach involving an assessment of both the relevant cultural and legal contexts. Sedillo Lopez’s proposal dovetails with the “world traveling” methodology of Isabelle R. Gunning featured in her seminal article on female genital surgeries excerpted in the original Critical Race Feminism reader.34 World traveling demands that we see ourselves in historical context, see ourselves as the “other” might see us, and see the “other” within our own complex cultural and legal context.

The prolific St. Johns Law School professor Berta Esperanza Hernández Truyol turns her gaze on the land of her birth and uses a contextualized methodology to deconstruct the nature of feminism in the Cuban context. In earlier work, she concludes that gender equality was a myth in that country. Here she reevaluates that position because gender equality in the Western feminist sense was never a goal of Cuban women’s groups. While the Cuban movement has been very successful in its own cultural context, she ends with the question of whether a feminist movement can exist independent from notions of true equality. Her concluding query has implications for the research of the Islamic feminist scholar Azizah Y. al-Hibri, featured later in the collection.

While Cossman, Sedillo Lopez, and Hernández-Truyol concern themselves with comparative law, the young scholar Vasuki Nesiah boldly criticizes traditional feminist international human rights scholarship for its insularity, and calls for increased engagement between Third World and First World women. Nesiah anticipates my notions of multiplicative identity discussed above and desires to work toward “gendered understandings of the regulation of sexuality, class, race, nationality, and ethnicity.”

The Puerto Rican feminist Celina Romany calls for international human rights law to use an intersectional approach to demarginalize the plight of Black women around the world. She also illustrates the “incoherence of a system of international
protection built from the perspective of compartmentalized selves” that manifests itself in several major international agreements, including the Women’s Convention and the Race Convention.

The international law scholar Hope Lewis is best known for her work on female genital surgeries that was excerpted in Critical Race Feminism: A Reader. She ends the first part of the collection on a different note. She turns her gaze inward as Cossman suggests and overtly attempts to apply the hazily defined international right of development within the boundaries of the United States to the most disenfranchised groups of women of color. Endorsing the importance of discourse that characterizes Critical Race Theory, Lewis implicitly calls for a feminism that embraces transformative coalition building to reconceptualize women’s economic development projects.

Part 2 continues Lewis’s focus on the Third World that exists in the First World. While she was concerned with the United States, the primary locus for most CRT and CRF theorists, the authors in part 2 demarginalize the treatment of minorities in Europe and New Zealand. Questions for the reader to ponder include, What similarities and differences in oppression do these minorities face as compared to U.S. based groups? Does American antidiscrimination law or affirmative action policy have anything to offer to societies with different conceptualizations and awareness of discrimination? Could culturally relevant forms of feminist theory and praxis evolve in these societies that would assist the women in helping themselves and pressuring majority group male power elites?

In the context of British postcolonialism, UCLA law professor Devon Carbado tackles the question of whether the oppressed are oppressed, even if they do not feel their own oppression. He deconstructs the nature of motherhood, work, and patriarchy—effectively interspersing the narrative voice of his Jamaican immigrant mother. Despite the patriarchal bargain she has made that mandates work inside and outside the home, she maintains a positive self-image as she struggles to raise nine children in the belly of the former colonizer Great Britain. She does not consider herself a multiply oppressed victim. “A lived my life de way A wanted to.” Yet her “freedom” in the context of their family life was really her husband’s.

We turn from the concerns of a poor female immigrant of color to a privileged woman in the chapter by Mai Chen, a Chinese lawyer and professor who movingly recounts her spirit injuries in simultaneously confronting race and sex discrimination growing up “down under.” Spirit injury is a Critical Race feminist notion that connotes the psychological consequences of discrimination.

Returning to the European context, the senior scholar Judy Scales-Trent conducted exciting original research demarginalizing the little known lives of immigrant women in France in the postcolonial period. These women must simultaneously confront race/ethnicity, gender, class, religious, and customary law restrictions in a country that has never exorcised all its demons from the colonial era. The multiplicative and nuanced nature of their oppression has been revealed in such well-publicized episodes as whether young Muslim girls can wear head scarves in French public schools. It is to be hoped that this article will be the basis for a book-
length treatment of the subject by Scales-Trent, the author of the compelling autobiography *Notes of a White Black Woman: Race, Color, Community*.

The final selection in part 2 presents another piece of original research conducted for this anthology. The Serbian feminist Zorica Mrsevic illustrates a CRT tenet on the social construction of race in her chapter on Gypsy women in Serbia. From an American racial perspective, the Gypsies would be considered “white.” Yet in the Serbian context, they are literally considered “Black,” and treated in all the derogatory ways that this status prompts in the United States. Mrsevic’s work benefits from the voices of abused Gypsy women, who also reveal how Gypsy patriarchy intersects with Serbian societal oppression. An interesting follow-up study would be to attempt to chart the impact of the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts on how Serbs treat Gypsy women.

Part 3 illustrates the use of critical theory historical method to reveal women of color who have been pathbreakers and founding mothers. The work of the three scholars featured here raises the question of how history can be more than accolades to male power elites. Can these women be role or goal models for everyone, especially other women of color? How can their stories be taken from the margins to the center of historical discourse? The legal historian Mary Dudziak is best known for her article “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative.” In her collection she produces another piece of Cold War scholarship focusing on the Black American entertainer/activist Josephine Baker. Dudziak meticulously combed U.S. government archives to portray the threat that Baker was felt to represent to American interests as she boldly denounced U.S. race discrimination laws in her travels to foreign countries. Baker did not wallow in victimhood, even when her livelihood and home were threatened. She waged her struggle in the private sphere as well, raising a “Rainbow Tribe” of twelve children.

J. Clay Smith, Jr., another legal historian, is the editor of *Rebels in Law: Voices in History of Black Women Lawyers*. Here he brings us a more contemporary and less well known example of a “(s)he-ro.” He explores the unsung role that the late Goler Teal Butcher, international lawyer and Howard law professor, played with regard to shaping U.S. foreign policy on Africa.

Alabama law professor Martha Morgan collaborates with her former student Mónica María Alzate Buitrago to take us beyond the U.S. context. They highlight a society in which there were founding mothers as well as fathers of a constitution. They explore how Colombian women managed to play both formal and informal roles in the attainment of progressive gender provisions, despite conditions of machismo and narcotrafficking violence. American feminists may have much to learn from the Colombian experience in the event that the question of constitutionally enshrined gender equality is tackled again in the United States.

Part 4 expands on the concerns raised by Morgan and various authors who grapple with the question of how law can successfully challenge the entrenched norms that prevent women, especially women of color, from reaching their full human potential.

The Islamic scholar Azizah al-Hibri produces a provocative contribution that challenges the Western notion that Islamic law must be patriarchal, oppressive, and
incompatible with human rights. Additionally, it challenges Islamic interpretations that assume that patriarchy is divinely ordained. Al-Hibri’s feminist intervention posits that Islam can be stripped of its false patriarchal presumptions in a way that permits women to remain true to their faith and achieve equality as well.

UCLA law professor Taimie Bryant takes us to Asia for the first time in the collection in her extensively researched work on the Japanese family registration system. She explicates the patriarchal nature of the regime, which is shored up by deeply rooted hierarchical Confucian ideology, despite the post–World War II imposition of more egalitarian constitutional norms. To alter the system, Bryant radically calls for a praxis based on Japanese majority group women working in coalition with other disadvantaged groups, including the shunned burakumin minority, immigrant Koreans, and out-of-wedlock children.

In her chapter on female infanticide in China, Sharon K. Hom speaks from the postcolonial borderlands: “an American by citizenship; a British colonial subject by birth; a Chinese American by culture.” She immerses us in the custom that has been exacerbated as China attempts to impose the one-child policy on a society with a historical preference for boys: female infanticide. Interspersing narrative in her analysis of the Women’s Convention, Hom looks toward a twenty-first-century future in which all children would be valued, and human rights conventions would be “superfluous anachronisms of a more primitive time.”

The next two selections tackle the universalism versus cultural relativism debate in international human rights law within the context of female genital surgeries (FGS), alternatively known as female circumcision or female genital mutilation. Is FGS an outright abomination and violation of the human rights of women and girls that must be universally condemned or is there room for various cultural practices like FGS to continue, especially if they are endorsed by many of the “oppressed” women who have undergone them?

The discussion represents a dialogue between two prominent legal academics in the field. The Nigerian scholar Lesyle Obiora calls for medical clinicalization of the practice. In her view, performing a relatively symbolic procedure under hygienic circumstances would constitute a middle course between absolute universality (ban it altogether) and absolute relativity (leave us alone).

The African American professor Isabelle Gunning agrees with Obiora that there are “racist and hypocritical manipulations of the imagery and lives of African women” in the anti-FGS campaign. Nevertheless, she finds Obiora’s clinicalization approach insufficient without a broader context of opposition to FGS practices. Additionally, Gunning posits that Obiora essentializes the views of Western feminists in the same way that she claims that Western feminists monolithically portray the lives and views of African women.

Lisa A. Crooms addresses cultural relativism in the United States in the closing selection. Although the United States has not yet signed the Women’s Convention, the author brings its refreshing perspectives to the public housing problem, which has heretofore been regarded only through the U.S. law lens. “Unless and until the United States abandons its reactionary and conservative brand of cultural relativism, the
tivism, the integrity of the rights of women within its borders, particularly poor women, will remain compromised.”

Part 5 presents another example of the clash between custom and human rights: violence against women, whether it be family terrorism, rape, or sexual harassment. While the O. J. Simpson trial and the Anita Hill–Clarence Thomas hearings popularized these issues in the United States, these contributors illustrate the universality of the problem in culturally specific contexts. Penelope Andrews speaks from the borderlands of multiplicative identity mentioned by her colleague Sharon Hom. But in Andrews’s case, she is a South African–born Coloured woman who lives in New York and holds Australian citizenship as well. She demarginalizes the nature of violence against the minority Aboriginal women in Australia. She then creatively speculates about the possibilities for redress within human rights paradigms for this multiply oppressed group of women who must deal with the legacy of Anglo colonialism and patriarchy coupled with Aboriginal patriarchal practices as well.

Another borderlands scholar, the Canadian-based Ghanaian professor Rosemary Ofei-Aboaeye King draws our attention to domestic violence in postcolonial Ghana, “The largest problem in (not) talking about domestic violence is its nonproblem status.” She provides us with narrative analysis on two levels. First, we hear the voices of the abused women themselves, who were surveyed as clients of the Legal Aid Clinic of the International Federation of Women Lawyers. King also critically analyzes Ghanaian folk tales to reveal how they continue to support women’s mistreatment. Her proposed solutions include further research, teaching methods of self-help, and communal education that can acknowledge and incorporate tradition.

My own contribution to the discussion is a comparative analysis of the violence problem in South Africa and Palestine. I speculate about the feasibility of using international human rights agreements, such as the Women’s Convention coupled with the incorporation of gender equality on the constitutional level, and implementing legislation as well. South Africa can serve as a model for the world since its 1996 constitution even contains a clause prohibiting both public and private violence. Praxis must be based on effectively linking grassroots organizations with the police, legal system, academy, and family.

City University of New York law professor Jenny Rivera then returns us to the North American context and her homeland as she analyzes our “pseudocolony” Puerto Rico’s Ley 54, the Domestic Violence Prevention and Intervention Law. She hopes her preliminary assessment of the case law, illustrating the limited efficacy of this “model” statute battling machismo, will be useful in other jurisdictions.

Finally, the young lawyer Gaby Oré-Aguilar looks at sexual harassment and human rights in Latin America. Her brief visionary exegeesis advocates that sexual harassment be characterized as a gender-based act of violence under international human rights law and national legislation in the countries of the region.

Part 6 ends the collection with a focus on the global workplace. It illustrates that those concerned with the rights of women of color, who constitute the most subordinated groups of workers, cannot limit their vigilance to their local or national boundaries. As the new century commences, global capitalism appears triumphant.
over socialism. Is it possible for national legislation and international law to work together to police multinational corporations that are richer than many developing nations? What can be done to enhance the economic opportunities for women of color with safe, well-paid working conditions? How can we prevent the last hired, first fired syndrome that seems to plague women the world over?

The attorney Laura Ho and Professors Catherine Powell and Leti Volpp collaborate to address some of these questions in their chapter on women workers in the worldwide garment industry. They confront those of us in the North with the query, “My sister makes my blouse. Are my hands clean?” The chapter examines the challenges that U.S.–based female garment workers face in asserting their human rights since U.S. labor law is unable to effectively serve their needs. The authors present multiple, alternative global strategies to spur creative thinking on building “transnational solidarity among workers, among women, and among communities.”

The former law firm partner Anna M. Han provides a comparative law perspective on her homeland in her chapter on marketization and the status of women in China. Although the implementation of capitalist economic principles may be positive for the largest communist country as a whole, it has had an unanticipated impact on female workers. Whatever its political shortcomings, communism greatly enhanced women’s economic status and ability to transcend deeply rooted patriarchal norms. The author leaves us with the question of how Chinese women will regain the lost ground and continue forward on the long march toward gender equality.

The attorney Kiyoko Kamio Knapp ends the collection with another foreign law selection in her essay on Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL). Japan’s global economic success has not included transcendence of cultural norms that regard women as “office flowers.” In her analysis, the EEOL emerges as a mere ornament totally inadequate to the enormity of the task. She calls for Japan to one day become a society where “harmonizing work life with family life should be a true goal for both men and women.”

NOTES

At the end of this introduction I have included a brief bibliography of some general sources on feminist approaches to international/global legal issues. The bibliography at the end of the book contains a large number of additional works that focus on the legal status of women of color globally. It also contains the full citations to the articles in this collection that have been previously published. Due to space limitations, I had to severely edit many of these wonderful pieces, deleting much text and many of the rich endnotes to which American legal scholarship is addicted. These deletions are not indicated in the edited text. I encourage you to seek the unedited versions. One advantage of the editing process is that almost all authors had a chance to review the edited versions, and some chose to update their previous work. Since the previously published articles came from a wide variety of sources, I decided to standardize the citations to conform to The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (16th edition). The Bluebook font styles are not followed, however.


16. Crenshaw, supra note 8, at xxix.
18. West, supra note 11, at xi.

20. For examples of the narrative technique, see, e.g., the works of Derrick Bell, such as And We Are not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice (1987); and Richard Delgado, such as the Rodrigo Chronicles (1995). For critics, see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law (1997).


23. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990); Crenshaw, supra note 7.

24. Some of this section was initially delineated in Adrien Katherine Wing, Violence and State Accountability: Critical Race Feminism, 1 Georgetown J. Gender, Sexuality and L. 95 (1999).

25. For an analysis of the American social construction of race, see Ian Haney Lopez, White by Law (1997).


27. For more on Beauregard, see T. Harry Williams, P. G. T. Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray (1955).

28. I have written extensively on Palestine. See, e.g., Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The Future Legal Status of Palestinian Women, 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 149 (1994); and items listed in the bibliography to this volume.


30. For examples of global feminist jurisprudence, see the bibliography at the end of this introduction.


32. Id. at ix.

33. Mohanty, supra note 2.


35. See Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, in Critical Race Feminism, supra note 34, at 352.

36. Wing, supra note 22. The term derives from spirit murder, coined by CRF foremother Patricia Will Respo.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS


